compared to non-Indigenous Australians (see, for example, Altman 2001b). For example, Indigenous people are more dispersed than other Australians, many live in remote regions with few employment opportunities, while poor education, housing, health and income status reinforces their disadvantage. Consequently, Indigenous Australians are significantly more likely to be impoverished than non-Indigenous Australians-across many indicators. 3 Compared to non-Indigenous Australians, unemployment is 3.2 times higher for Indigenous peoples and Indigenous life expectancy is 17 years lower than that for the total Furthermore, until relatively recently, Indigenous Australians enjoyed few formal legal and political rights, and struggled to access many mainstream government services. Limitations of parliamentary representation are starkly evident in the Indigenous experience: the small number of Indigenous voters and their geographic dispersal translates to little electoral 'muscle'. In a democratic system largely dominated by formal parliamentary representative politics, many Indigenous communities have been marginalised to the extent that they are unable to acquire political influence necessary to meet their objectives. In addition, disenchantment with formal structures and processes of representative parliamentary democracy has been deepened by concerted government efforts to facilitate mining, often regardless of the articulated opposition or concerns of local Indigenous communities (seen in the examples below). Such government actions over-ride the wishes of local communities, undermining the influence of Indigenous citizens in decisions that acutely affect them.
In addition, substitution-the risk of citizenship entitlements being deliberately reduced-is faced by some Indigenous communities where mining takes place. Government substituting royalty or other benefits derived from mining in the place of government provision results in a reduction of state finance for community services ( . 4 This is made more complex from a democratic perspective: perceptions that existing lack of government service delivery (or threatened reduction) might lead some Indigenous communities to acquiesce to mining if they view mining as the only means to obtain necessary outcomes-health and education services or employment, for example.
The deficiencies of representative democracy thus necessitate supplementary means of delivering democratic ideals such as self-determination and inclusion of those affected in policy-making ( If Indigenous communities can, using the tool of civil regulation (see Trebeck 2007a), compel companies to reflect their demands, then the sovereignty, self-determination and sustainability of these communities has been advanced. How this tool is manoeuvred to attain community expectations depends on several factors, pertaining to both the communities and the company in question. The examples below seek to elicit some of these factors to enhance understanding of the connection between corporate social responsibility and social sustainability.
Corporate social responsibility: A definition
This chapter conceives corporate social responsibility as those company activities, other than commercial outputs, and beyond legally required behaviour, taken in order to satisfy social needs and demands (see Trebeck 2008a). Motivation is of particular importance in this conception: these are activities taken in response to community demands or with a view to addressing social needs that impact the business. They are ultimately impelled by business needs, as opposed to moral or ethical connotations sometimes implied by 'responsibility'. The pragmatic rationale of such responsiveness reflects that in order to serve shareholder interests, attention to the demands of some groups beyond shareholders is necessary (see, for example, 
Civil regulation
Bendell defines civil regulations as those 'pressures exerted by processes in civil society to persuade, or even compel, organisations to act differently in relation to social and environmental concerns' (Bendell 2000a; see also Murphy and Bendell 1999). 6 A particular manifestation of civil regulation with salience for mining companies is the necessity to obtain and maintain a 'social licence to operate'. While minimum levels of acceptable company behaviour are specified in laws and regulations, social obligations are no longer discharged by simply carrying out legal minimum duties. 
Social sustainability through civil regulation and corporate social responsibility?
In order to explore the bearing these processes have on social sustainability in the sense of community self-determination, several empirical examples are outlined here to assess whether the vulnerability of companies to civil regulation actually empowers those communities otherwise disempowered by formal representative democracy. These cases explore how corporate responsiveness to community pressures represents an opportunity for Indigenous people to express themselves beyond mainstream political structures, obtaining sought outcomes using extra-parliamentary tactics, such as a sit-in, shareholder activism, media campaigns or tactical use of legislation.
These case studies are only 'flashpoints' in complex ongoing relationships between respective mining companies and local Indigenous communities. They are not presented as definitive accounts, but as illustrations of the potential leverage affected communities might be able to exert over companies and of how impetus for responsiveness gain traction within respective companies. An understanding of why and when companies respond to community demands, appreciating the potential and limitations of community leverage, enables more nuanced analysis of opportunities for social sustainability.
Century Mine
In the Gulf of Carpentaria in Queensland many Indigenous people have low formal education and suffer poor health, with one of the lowest life expectancies on average in Australia. 9 Until zinc mining began at Century Mine, most employment was through the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme (Martin 1998b; Williams 1999). Gulf Indigenous communities have, however, to some degree been able to hold the operators of Century mine to account and attain certain concessions from the miner as a result.
In the 1990s local Indigenous communities, and in particular one charismatic individual accepted by many as representative of broader community views, were able to impel the prospective developer and operator of Century mine, CRA (Rio Tinto's predecessor in Australia), to the negotiating The Queensland Government strongly supported the project, given Century's employment and regional economic importance. During a difficult point in negotiations, it even offered legislation to by-pass Commonwealth native title legislation, which would enable the mine to proceed, regardless of any claims Indigenous people might have under native title (Cook 1997). This option was refused by CRA which, as outlined below, had come to understand that such litigious tactics did not advance harmonious community relationships.
The emerging corporate strategy to seek community support came, however, from senior employees on the ground, rather than any directive from CRA headquarters. Recognition of Indigenous interests, and the potential implications of Indigenous opposition to mine development, was brought to Century by Century's Managing Director based on his prior experience with Hamersley Iron's Marandoo Mine in Western Australia (discussed below).
During a protracted negotiation period company negotiators increased an initial offer to local Indigenous communities of $70 000 cash to an eventual $60 million package. The bargaining position utilised by Indigenous interests-by virtue of native title legal provisions, delay tactics and the use of public forums-rendered those seeking to 'regulate' the miner visible to company managers and prominent in company decision-making equations (Trebeck 2005; Trigger 1998). Delays impinging on commercial standing and threats to corporate reputation demonstrated that when Indigenous communities comprehend and penetrate contexts in which large companies operate, they can press for certain corporate behaviour and demonstrable community benefit.
In 1997 representatives from registered native title claimants, the Queensland Government, and Century Zinc Mine signed the Gulf Communities Agreement (GCA). The GCA enabled the mine to go ahead despite outstanding native title claims over the area. It committed the owner of Century to spend $60 million (in 1997 terms) over the life of the mine on employment and training, community development, and payments to native title parties. It pledged native title groups to allow Century's operation in return. With the financial problems that preceded administration, Pasminco's concern with community relations at Century lessened -the short term priority of financial sustainability ostensibly assumed priority, to the exclusion of other aspects of sustainability. Insufficient effort and resources were deployed to satisfy the expectations of local Indigenous communities, and Pasminco's focus was limited to compliance with strict contractual aspects of the GCA. Responsibility for GCA implementation was subordinated to a unit within Century's Human Resources. It seems that as Pasminco's financial concerns dominated, community relations suffered. Key individuals supporting community relations effort had left, been retrenched or were largely unable to achieve traction in a company where individuals with authority to affect substantial change no longer appreciated the relevance of the business case for sound community relations. For many local Indigenous people though, the mine was not seen as delivering benefit to the region beyond employment of individuals (Hall and Driver 2002).
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There were a number of further complaints, but efforts to convey them to the company proved futile. In November 2002, between 50 and 80 people, mainly residents of Doomadgee (the Indigenous community closest to the mine), occupied the mine site kitchen. The protest did not halt production, but did constitute both an inconvenience and an underlying threat that the action could escalate and impede operations, a particularly ominous consequence given Pasminco's then perilous financial circumstances. After nine days an end to the sit-in was negotiated between those involved, Pasminco and the Queensland Government.
There seems to be recognition from both Indigenous people involved and Century that there has been positive change in the relationship between communities and company since the sit-in. 12 One observer states that the sit-in gave the company a 'wake-up call' that it needed to pay more attention to community issues. 13 It highlighted the repercussions of not being sufficiently proactive in community relationships. Since the sit-in '[Century's] eyes are back on the ball, they now appreciate that the GCA is their "licence to operate", and if they do not sufficiently implement the GCA according to community expectations they will lose this licence'. 14 
Hamersley Iron
In the late 1980s, Hamersley Iron ('Hamersley' now Pilbara Iron), a Rio Tinto subsidiary based in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, sought to develop the Marandoo iron ore deposit located within the Hamersley National Park, and litigious tactics to progress Marandoo's development, including a media campaign to pressure the Western Australia Government to speed up approval processes. 17 Marandoo was complicated by its location within a National Park and environmentalist's concerns about endangering a rare species of mouse. 18 An alliance of sorts arose between environmental groups and Indigenous interests in opposition to the mine. 
Jabiluka
Rio Tinto's changing approach towards responsiveness to those with capacity to impact mine operations constitutes the background in which Rio Tinto acquired North Limited in 2000. North owned 68.4 per cent of Energy Resources of Australia (ERA), which owned the Jabiluka uranium mineral lease in the Northern Territory. The Jabiluka example illustrates the sorts of circumstances that might prevent mining altogether. In seeking to attain a social licence to operate, the language of 'win-win' outcomes is often used by miners to justify their presence and promote what they bring to a community. This assumes that mining will proceed and that local communities can derive outcomes sufficiently beneficial they can be described as a 'win' for the communities. Such language and its implication leaves little room for communities to reject mining outright. The campaign against development of Jabiluka illustrates how such a rejection can be enforced-that is, how the social licence to operate can be withheld (see also Trebeck 2007a, 2009).
The anti-Jabiluka campaign involved the confluence of three issues: local Indigenous opposition, Jabiluka's location surrounded by the World Heritage listed Kakadu National Park, and concerns over uranium mining. Protest by campaigners for Indigenous land rights, environmentalists, and anti-nuclear activists encompassed legal action, efforts at education, mobilisation of national and international opposition, physical demonstrations, shareholder activism and parliamentary lobbying. The culmination of these components of the campaign against Jabiluka meant that a seemingly hopeless situation faced by a small and historically marginalised community was transcended. Jabiluka became an iconic struggle for anti-uranium stalwarts, but anti-uranium and environmental opposition to Jabiluka derived much potency from the discontent of traditional owners-the Mirrar people. Key traditional owners of the Jabiluka prospect have been unambiguous in their opposition to Jabiluka's development in recent times, opposition informed by concerns over the disturbance of sacred sites and experience of the nearby Ranger uranium mine where social and environmental impacts are considered adverse.
Campaigning by the Senior Traditional Owner, Yvonne Margarula, and the then Executive Officer of the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, Jacqui Katona, mobilised the international non-governmental organisation community, and led institutions such as the European Parliament and the United States Congress to pass resolutions against Jabiluka's development. In 1998 Margarula attended the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Heritage Bureau meeting in Paris, instigating a UNESCO Mission to Kakadu. The mission reported to the United Nations World Heritage Committee that there were 'significant ascertained and potential threats' to the National Park associated with development of Jabiluka, and recommended construction work at Jabiluka be halted.
The Australian Government refused to adopt these recommendations and the Department of Foreign Affairs reportedly spent six months and over $1 million lobbying the United Nations World Heritage Committee and key decision-makers in its member countries, ultimately leading to the United Nations not placing Kakadu National Park on the endangered list (Banerjee 2000).
Jabiluka was opposed by many of Australia's environmental organisations, church, trade union and community groups. The Australian Senate passed a resolution opposing Jabiluka's development. An opinion poll in 1998 found that 67 per cent of Australians were against mining at Jabiluka. 28 In urban centres protest against Jabiluka grew, including large rallies and public events in all capital and many regional cities. In March 1998 a blockade was established near the Jabiluka site, lasting eight months and involving over 5000 people. More than 500 protestors were arrested for trespass, including traditional owner Yvonne Margarula. The blockade meant that the company could not access the mine site as desired, despite being given legislative permission to mine and supported by strong government backing. By flying employees and equipment to the site by helicopter ERA was, however, able to complete construction of the mine decline and retention pond in 1999.
ERA and its parent company North thus faced prolonged opposition to development of the Jabiluka mine. Annual General Meetings and company headquarters became 'combat zones' where anti-Jabiluka campaigners targeted shareholders and company management. 29 In March 1999, the Melbourne premises of North were blockaded for four days. Activists also lobbied major North investors directly. Various financial institutions were sent anti-Jabiluka material, and in 1998 there was a national day of action targeting North's main bank, Westpac, for its involvement. By June 1999 almost $7 million worth of North shares had been divested. Insurance company NRMA, for example, stated publicly that the reason for selling its North shares was concern about Jabiluka, deeming the project to be financially, politically and environmentally risky. Alongside the disinvestment by some financial institutions, there was strident shareholder activism. The Wilderness Society obtained North's share register and contacted over 67 000 shareholders, informing them about Jabiluka and instigating the formation of a shareholder pressure group, North Ethical Shareholders. In October 1999 an Extraordinary General Meeting was held at the instigation of North Ethical Shareholders. Although the proposals put by the North Ethical Shareholders were defeated, the event attracted significant negative publicity for North and required diversion of management time to dealing with the activists.
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It seems, given North's strident pursuit of Jabiluka's development and its reaction to protests, that the company was almost impervious to many elements of the anti-Jabiluka campaign. Construction at the Jabiluka mine took place regardless of traditional owner objections. Arguably, if elements of the campaign such as urban protest and international institutions opposing the mine did not achieve their objective, they at least bolstered traditional owners in their manoeuvring against Jabiluka.
A significant lever that traditional owners wielded was the location of the mill for Jabiluka ore and an access road between nearby Ranger and Jabiluka. Traditional owners, by virtue of a clause in a 1991 lease transfer agreement (transferring ownership from Pancontinental to ERA), held an effective veto over milling of Jabiluka ore at the Ranger mill. The cost of building a mill to process Jabiluka ore at the Jabiluka site was over $200 million, a cost ERA hoped to avoid by trucking ore to the existing Ranger mill 22 kilometres away. In the context of then poor uranium prices, the veto over doing so, effectively necessitating construction of a new mill at Jabiluka, made the economics of the Jabiluka project far less attractive to ERA and North.
There were two phases in the campaign to stop development of Jabiluka-before and after 2000 when Rio Tinto acquired North, and with it majority ownership of ERA. Rio Tinto would seek to avoid mining without community consent, whereas North seemed to rely on government sanction to mine, regardless of whether local communities sanctioned this or not. Rio Tinto's position was that although the Northern Territory and Commonwealth Governments supported the mine, this was insufficient, as consent was also needed from traditional owners. Paradoxically perhaps, being a large international company with an important brand, making a concerted public effort to move away from historic poor performance, and seeking to cultivate positive reputation amongst Indigenous communities more broadly, Rio Tinto was seemingly unwilling to weather the reputational attacks that North ostensibly tolerated. The potential cost to Rio Tinto's reputation of proceeding with Jabiluka in the face of local opposition was increasingly evident as adverse market conditions for uranium in the few years after acquiring ERA made Jabiluka relatively marginal to Rio Tinto's overall commercial strategy-as one observer said, the Rio Tinto brand was 'suffering much grief for a little mine'. 32 For example, in September 2002
Rio Tinto's stake in ERA was worth $172 million, less than 1 per cent of Rio Tinto's total net present value. 33 In late March 2001, Rio Tinto's Chief Executive Officer indicated that the company would not support development of Jabiluka unless there was a substantial alteration of community attitudes, alongside improved uranium prices (Clifford 2001) . 34 This moderate concession did not placate the anti-Jabiluka campaign. At Rio Tinto's Australian Annual General Meeting the following month protestors held a 'die-in' and company shareholders were forced to step over 'dying' protestors. 35 At Rio Tinto's London Annual General Meeting the next year, a statement on behalf of traditional owners was presented, rejecting mining on Mirrar land and demanding that Rio Tinto leave the area. In September 2002 Rio Tinto Chairman Sir Robert Wilson strengthened his company's position not to mine Jabiluka without acceptance from traditional owners; he also stated, for the first time, that the site would be rehabilitated and the mine's entrance sealed. 36 Until this declaration, the Mirrar had understood that despite their protests the Jabiluka mine could still go ahead without their approval once Ranger was no longer operational. An agreement (the Jabiluka Long Term Care and Maintenance Agreement) has subsequently been developed between ERA and traditional owners and their representatives, regarding rehabilitation and maintenance of the Jabiluka site and future consultation over development.
An important element of the Jabiluka campaign, with parallels in both Hamersley Iron's experience at Marandoo and negotiations for Century mine, was the role of government. In each case both state and Commonwealth governments sought to facilitate mine development, including passing special legislation or ignoring United Nations recommendations. Government approved development of Jabiluka in spite of protests by traditional owners, as well as wider opposition. Government support for Jabiluka has been on 'national interest' grounds, with the Prime Minister citing the imperatives of globalisation as necessitating Jabiluka's development.
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Some commentators have portrayed Rio Tinto and ERA's position of not mining without local community consent, and the anti-Jabiluka campaign that drove this strategy, as a 'David and Goliath' win for the Mirrar people. Katona observes that it demonstrates how: a bunch of women from the bush, the majority of whom were illiterate, spoke English as a second or third language, stuck to their guns, and took on the mining company, and hunted them down … Wherever the mining company was speaking publicly we were able to have agents or representations made … directly to the face of the company to … let them know that we were not going to be beaten....
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It shows what leverage is necessary to capture corporate attention and response: ability to impact the commercial position of the company, whether in the short term through economic levers or over the long term via influence on company reputation.
Discussion and conclusion
These case studies suggest that uptake of corporate social responsibility depends on responsive individuals in the company, especially senior management, being receptive to the pressures for responsiveness; namely those that appeal to commercial interest. Once a company has accorded a community group or organisation 'stakeholder' status, the degree to which their demands are acknowledged and addressed is a function of how managers perceive stakeholder 36 While a moral motivation might be sufficient in some cases and for some individuals, because the raison d'être of companies is profit and commercial continuity there is a need to understand and communicate the business case for corporate social responsibility internally to achieve change in corporate responsiveness to community demands. Only when the strength of a business case is evident will resources be dedicated to implementing corporate social responsibility (McLaren 2002; Parker 2002) . Thus, if an individual or group is completely ineffectual in relation to a company, then there is unlikely to be a persuasive business case for the company to respond to the interests of these entities, save for a sense of moral duty held by some individuals within a firm.
The examples of Century, Hamersley Iron, Rio Tinto and the anti-Jabiluka campaign support the contention that key individuals within organisations, notwithstanding any personal moral motivations, ultimately rely on business case arguments to gain internal traction for change and operational support for corporate social responsibility initiatives. In turn, however, the effectiveness of otherwise austere structures and policies comes from individuals. These individuals may be driven by either an appreciation of the business case, company policies, promotion and pay incentives, or moral commitment to improved Indigenous relations (Trebeck 2005).
That civil regulation often hinges on key individuals can, potentially, constitute risk. When such (arguably 'enlightened') individuals leave or when incidents that initially highlighted the need for corporate social responsibility recede in relative prominence in management attention then the drive and vigour of implementation is likely to abate. For example, for a time corporate social responsibility was ostensibly deemed relatively less important than the eventual catastrophic financial situation of Century's parent company. Developing structures to internalise corporate social responsibility might reduce the burden of advocacy away from a few individuals. Equally, however, structures themselves are insufficient: frameworks and programs to deliver corporate social responsibility are of little use if those charged with implementation do not do so with enthusiasm, understanding and appreciation of the necessity of their task. This was evident in the way some committees created to implement the GCA at Century were mismanaged, becoming counter-productive and a cause of community discontent that eventually impelled, in part, the 2002 sit-in (Trebeck 2005) .
Civil regulation then is successful when community actions (or deliberate inactions) recognise that the most effective way in which to shape company behaviour is via financial gain or loss, thereby creating a business case for desired corporate change. It is individuals in the company who must recognise this business case, as occurred when management attention to the need for sound community relations became focused by incidents such as Bougainville's forced closure, the Marandoo dispute, the advent of native title, Century's sit-in and the anti-Jabiluka campaign. Here, a shift in the balance of external influences brings Indigenous demands to the fore by-directly or indirectly-threatening financial performance. When such civil regulation consequently gains corporate response there has invariably been a convergence of personal commitment and commercial imperative.
Given that companies are neither uncomplicated nor internally homogeneous, community pressures for corporate social responsibility will affect respective elements of a company differently. Adding to this complexity, both the organisation itself and individuals within it, function within a diverse social system (Keskinen, Aaltonen and Mitleton-Kelly 2003). Companies are porous entities, with individual employees having their own external networks that inform their actions and motivations. Once the objectives of individuals within companies are accumulated, and external stakeholders accounted for, companies can be seen as assemblies of relationships with respective audiences, requiring specific corporate responses and actions. This was evident, for example, in the divergent expectations of corporate behaviour held by the financial sector, compared with those of local communities, seen during Pasminco's financial difficulties.
There are frequently structural causes of such divergence. Employees at mine sites-where much corporate social responsibility is made manifest-often have strict job requirements that encompass output quotas, directing their priorities towards immediate production targets. Business units are faced with contradictory signals from headquarters, with consequent dilemmas regarding priorities: they must deliver production targets, reduction of costs and manage industrial relations, while also being expected to implement more intangible, costly community relations initiatives with their inherently longer-term outcomes. Time and production constraints in pursuit of profit often override other pressures. If corporate social responsibility initiatives are deemed expensive relative to other objectives, they are unlikely to be entered into, unless mandated by headquarters. Those at headquarters are charged with navigating the company's external environment for the longevity of shareholder value, whereas managers at mine sites appreciate less the geographical cross-subsidisation of reputational capital.
In addition, an essential element in the notion of civil regulation is the section of civil society doing the 'regulating'. Findings from the case studies suggest that there are several characteristics of civil society that might undermine the capacity of civil regulation to deliver beyond isolated instances. The representativeness of civil society-how those organisations demanding change from companies reflect the actual needs and demands of those in whose interests they purport to act-is vital. The greater the deficit in organisations' representativeness, the greater the likelihood that results of civil regulation will be skewed away from the interests of those affected. Such distortion, where outcomes do not reflect the actual wishes and expectations of communities, undermines any advancement of citizen sovereignty over companies.
The nature of the 'civil regulators' is an area for further research. It is worth suggesting, however, that it is in the company's interest to understand how any organisation actually relates to and represents its constituents-relationships will ultimately be undermined if citizens feel they are disenfranchised by engagement taking place between companies and certain elements of civil society. The structure of Century's GCA reflects dilemmas associated with civil society organisations. Part of the discontent that led to the 2002 sit-in at Century Mine was a feeling amongst some local Indigenous community members that they had not been sufficiently accounted for in the GCA, referring to themselves as 'the forgotten Waanyi' and eventually seeking alternative means (the sit-in) by which to achieve their demands.
Given these (and other) caveats, civil regulation and increased community participation in corporate decision-making is insufficient to attain the stated aims of particular communities (Bendell 2000a; Trebeck 2005; see also Maddox 1991). This limits the scope for social sustainability potentially realised through corporate social responsibility. Moreover, necessity of the business case highlights a role for civil society in maintaining vigilance and sustaining the context that prompts companies to consider communities. Inevitably the capacity of civil society to sustain this vigilance will be shaped by factors underpinning a community's sustainability, while corporate social responsibility itself can increase the sustainability of a community (see Trebeck 2007b). Emerging from this complex multi-directional relationship is evidence that the success of civil regulation to deliver community wishes in some contexts, as illustrated above, does illustrate that social sustainability can be advanced by utilising various levers to alter corporate operating frameworks.
